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THE GOVERNMENT CAN'T, MAY, OR MUST FUND
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: THREE RIDDLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE FOR LAURENCE TRIBE

Martha Minow*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a 1975 article, Laurence Tribe explored how three separate puzzles of
constitutional law might seem more solvable when viewed together. 1 It was an arresting
claim, especially as puzzle designers ratchet up levels of difficulty when they combine
two or more puzzles into one. 2 Tribe's use of joint riddles to solve problems is mirrored
in recent scientific work joining computational biology and genetics. Scientists in those
fields proceed with the hope that a difficult problem can be understood, if not resolved,
by locating it as a part of a bigger problem. 3 In that hope, and inspired by the
scholarship and advocacy of Professor Tribe, I tackle here quandaries of constitutional
change surrounding the constitutionality of public funding for private schools-where
the funding scheme excludes religious schools. Three puzzles become unavoidable:
How can the demands of both the Establishment and Free Exercise clause be satisfied;

* Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Cass Sunstein, Robert Post, and
Reva Siegel for helpful comments, and to Larry Tribe for friendship and inspiration.
1. Laurence H. Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications,and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked
Riddles, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. 8 (1975).
2. Bob Armstrong, Earliest Use of Special Techniquesfor Making Adult Jigsaw Puzzles, 3 Game & Puzzle
Collectors Q. (2002). One jigsaw puzzle, advertised as the most difficult in the world, is described this way:
This is no ordinary jigsaw puzzle! It's an insane, double sided puzzle which has the same artwork
on both sides, but offset 900 from each other. This puzzle is made from fine linen paper and
premium brand board that's distinctively tinted to showcase its quality and thickness. Buffalo
Games uses environmentally friendly soy based inks. Each piece is easy to hold, easy to see, and
"snaps" together. Pieces come within a poly-bag and shrink-wrapped box.
Cats 500pcs, http://www.hobbylinc.com/htm/buf/buf858.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2007).
3. Robert L. Glass, PracticalProgrammer: Is This a Revolutionary Idea, or Not? 47 Commun. ACM 23,
23-24
(2004)
(available
at
http://delivery.acm.org/10.I145/1030000/1029514/p23glass.html?key 1=1029514&key2=910202571 l&coll=&dl=GUIDE&CFID=l 5151515&CFTOKEN=6184618)
(exploring possible software construction by simultaneous work on parallel behavior trees-addressing
components (the software pieces), states (that those components can take on), events and decisions/constraints
(that are associated with the components), data that the components exchange, and the causal, logical, and
temporal dependencies (associated with component interactions)); Edward M. Marcotte, Assembling a Jigsaw
Puzzle with 20,000 Parts, 4 Genome Biology 323 (2003) (available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/
articlerender.fcgi?artid=193613) (exploring use of algorithms that to identify peptides from experimental
peptide fragmentation spectra in post-transformational states and studies of protein-protein interactions that
start with an algorithm that finds amino-acid sequences that pack well into a fixed protein structure, and create
a new interface between two DNA-binding domains of known structure).
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what does respecting precedent mean when there is a recent reversal of one line of cases;
and when does federalism demand deference to the supremacy of the federal constitution
or instead respect for state autonomy?
Although he addressed childhood, suspect classifications, and conclusive
presumptions, Professor Tribe's own proposal for dealing with his three puzzles
reverberates in the analysis of these issues. As he called for selective judicial
invalidation of certain conclusive presumptions-ensuring individualization in
government treatment of minors in some contexts-Professor Tribe characterized his
approach as a kind of "antidoctrine" reflecting social and political transition, moral
uncertainty, and marking how the courts would "facilitate, and take part in, the evolution
of moral-and thus legal--consciousness. 'A I suggest here that the Constitution's
demands will not be resolved through a new three-part test or other doctrinal solution,
but instead through particularized case-by-case judicial attention to the cumulative
impact of religious schooling on the character of the nation and the predicates for
inclusive democracy. Even though case-by-case decision-making allows for mistakes
and produces uncertainty, it also permits evolving and practical responsiveness to the
multiple priorities relevant to religion, schooling, and democracy.
II.

PUZZLE I: RELATING THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES

The first puzzle concerns the relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause in addressing public aid reaching religious schools. Without a
clear answer from history, text, or doctrine, government actors must somehow
simultaneously protect the free exercise of religion by individuals, even those without
mainstream practices, and avoid making any law "respecting" the establishment of
religion. 5 The central difficulty arises if a government official or agency devises an
accommodation, exempting members of a particular religion from an otherwise-

4. Tribe, supra n. 1, at 37.
5. U.S. Const. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Social, political, and legal changes make the religion clauses particularly
illustrative of the inevitability of changing constitutional interpretation. Even if there were agreement about the
framers' conceptions of the First Amendment's treatment of religion, changes in society and government since
the adoption of the Bill of Rights prevent straight-line continuity of interpretation. Justice Brennan has
emphasized how the contemporary religious heterogeneity far surpasses the diversity at the time of the
founding generation. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). As a result, Justice Brennan rejected the very focus on historical aims and instead argued that for
an inquiry into whether the challenged practices threaten "those consequences which the Framers deeply
feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote the type of interdependence between religion and state which
the First Amendment was designed to prevent." Id. at 236. There is, of course, far greater religious diversity in
the United States now than when Justice Brennan wrote that opinion. See generally Barry A. Kosmin, Egon
Mayer & Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey 10, http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty
/researchstudies/aris.pdf (last updated Dec. 19, 2001) ("[T]he proportion of the [American] population that
can be classified as Christian has declined from eighty-six in 1990 to seventy-seven percent in 2001."). This
trend reflects both growing presence of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, the increasing self-identification of
Native Americans, and the rapidly rising number of people who claim no religious identity. See Diana L. Eck,
A New Religious America: How a "Christian Country" Has Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse
Nation (Harper S.F. 2001); Cathy Grossman, Charting UnchurchedAmerica, USA Today 01d (Mar. 7, 2007)
(Fourteen percent of the nation does not follow any organized religion, almost double the eight percent reported
in 1990.). The expansion of government-producing many more occasions for potential contact between
religion and government-is another crucial change. See William W. Van Alstyne, ConstitutionalSeparation
of Church and State' The Questfora Coherent Position,57 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 865, 881 (1963).
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prevailing rule 6-for that very effort to allow free exercise of religion could be viewed
as an impermissible preference. 7 Some "play in the joints" seems necessary for the
commitments both to free exercise and to avoiding preference for religion, 8 but how
much?
This problem, difficult enough in the abstract, supplies the constitutional terrain for
decades of intense battles over public aid to parochial schools in the United States.
Parents seeking to provide religious education for their children are assured that
prerogative, 9 but governments seeking to assist those parents, or merely to provide a
"level playing field" rather than a government preference for secular instruction, run into
the Establishment Clause. Whether in the form of subsidies for teachers and materials or
tuition relief for students, public aid to parochial schools for several decades triggered
judicially-enforced Establishment Clause barriers on two grounds: 1) Public money must
not directly reach pervasively sectarian institutions; and 2) Public aid must not even
indirectly reach parochial schools if that would allow diversion of funds into religious
indoctrination.
This strict separationist view, developed in the mid-twentieth century, did not halt
continuing efforts to provide aid to religious schools or parents selecting them-and
constitutional arguments on their behalf. 11 Pro-aid forces can mount a free exercisestyle objection for interfering with the option of religious schooling that some parents
may believe necessary or desirable. 12 Especially where the local or state government
finances public schools, a special burden falls on parents or students who must pay out of
their own pockets if they seek to combine schooling with religious instruction for their
children. This burden on individual choice becomes especially pronounced where the
government offers funds to individuals choosing private education but only if it is not
religious:
The selective denial discourages religious-school choices and, at least prima facie,
communicates disfavor of them ....
[A] satisfactory K-12 education in math, English, and
history in a religious school imparts secular knowledge and provides significant secular

6. Hobbie v. Unempl. Apps. Commn., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409
(1963). Recently, a public school coach faced the conflict when the school board, following complaints by
some parents, prohibited his participation in student-led team prayers; a district court judge concluded that the
coach could participate-but did so in part by suggesting that the coach would not be praying but instead
providing leadership for the team. See Associated Press, Court's Call: N.J. Coach Can 'Take a Knee' While
Team Prays, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id= 17207 (July 27, 2006).
7. The preference could seem to run to members of a particular religion or to religion in general; either
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
8. See Walz v. Tax Commn. of the City of N. Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("[T]here is room for play in
the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
[governmental] sponsorship and without interference.").
9. See Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Both of these
cases invoke substantive due process as a frame for the parental right, but both also reflect free exercise
considerations.
10. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988). Four members of the Court rejected this view in a
plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000).
11. Starting with Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court
interpreted the Establishment Clause to guard the governmental raising of tax revenues to support religious
instruction or institutions.
12. See Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the Future of State
Payments for Services Providedby Religious Institutions, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 227 (2004).
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value to society-yet a state exclusion of religious schools withholds benefits even for that
unquestionable educational contribution. The family is not merely denied assistance for
to pursue its child's basic K-12 education
religious teaching, •but
13is penalized for choosing
in a religious setting.

14
Governments act unacceptably if they target specific religious groups for disapproval.
Historic antagonism over Catholic schools exacerbates the potential constitutional
difficulty with school subsidy programs that exclude religious schools by suggesting an
impermissible animus motivated the statutory and constitutional rules against any public
dollars ever reaching a private religious school. 15 The exclusion of religious schools
raise constitutional
from the set of educational options accorded public funding could 16
grounds.
discrimination
viewpoint
and
exercise
free
both
on
concerns
The chief defense that governments supply after excluding religious schools from
funding available to other schools is their concern to avoid violating legal restrictions on
government aid to religion. This defense crumbles if the Establishment Clause is reinterpreted to permit public funds to reach pervasively sectarian parochial schools when
part of a general, neutral scheme; indeed, then the strict separation approach becomes
unnecessary-and the tension with free exercise, viewpoint discrimination, and the
prohibition against targeting religions for negative treatment each disappear. The
general scheme could offer aid for secular activities at any school, or aid to parents and
students who select any accredited school-including a religious one. Arguably, through
such programs, the government would not be endorsing or advancing religion or any
particular religion. Instead, a general scheme through which the government makes
books and computers available to all schools, or extends vouchers to parents who select a

13. Thomas C. Berg, Why a State Exclusion of Religious Schools from School Choice Programs Is
Unconstitutional, 2 First Amend. L. Rev. 23, 27 (2003). An early effort to develop this argument appears in
Michael W, McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. Rev.
989, 1017-18, 1046-47 (1991). For an argument that rights of religious people in general face greater threats
in the United States than rights of secularists, see Joseph P. Viteritti, The Last Freedom: Religion from the
Public School to the Public Square (Princeton U. Press 2007).
14. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
15. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U. Chi.
L.J. 121 (2001). Moreover, the exclusion of religious schools from public subsidy programs may seem to or
actually fall most heavily on poor urban students of color, who face either failing public schools or better
parochial (usually Catholic) private schools. See generally Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School
Choice, the Constitution, and Civil Society (Brookings Instn. 2001). Catholic schools started largely as an
effort to maintain religious identity and avoid "an unwelcome assimilation," McConnell, supra n. 13, at 1043,
but "[ilt would be difficult to prove that the government's only reason for continuing to refuse to fund religious
schools is to induce religious assimilation." Id. at 1045.
16. On free exercise, see Nathan Lewin, How School Vouchers Can Win in the Supreme Court:
Distinguishing "What" from "How" in Aid to Religious Schools, http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/
SchoolVouchers.html (accessed Feb. 25, 2007). On viewpoint discrimination, see Good News Club v. Milford
C.Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.Rector & Visitors of the U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In each instance, a public university or school had excluded religious groups
from using the institution's space or resources and explained such exclusions as efforts to avoid Establishment
Clause violations, and in each case, the Court rejected the Establishment Clause rationale, and found the
exclusionary policies forms of impermissible viewpoint discrimination, violating the free speech guarantee of
the Constitution. For an argument that this equal treatment approach undermines the special significance of
religion by equating religious expression with any other kind of expression, see Derek H. Davis, A
Commentary on the Supreme Court's "Equal Treatment" Doctrine as the New Constitutional Paradigm for
Protecting Religious Liberty, 46 J. Church & St. 717, 735-36 (2004). See generally Equal Treatment of

Religion in a Pluralistic Society (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., Eerdmans Publg. Co. 1998).
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parochial school from a set of school options, advances equal regard for religious and
secular options.
This is undeniably a period of shifting judicial treatment of religion in the United
States, with particularly unsettled results for both the analysis of and outcomes in
Establishment Clause challenges to government action. Federal courts have recently
approved decisions by governments to provide religious groups access to programs open
to others and rejected governmental exclusions of religious groups from generally
available public resources. 17 For example, the Court found no Establishment Clause
problem with a school voucher program, allowing low-income parents to select religious
schools from among a range of schooling options.18 A fractured Court permitted public
display of the Ten Commandments in one setting but not in another. 19 As a sign of
shifting priorities, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division under the
administration of President George W. Bush devoted resources to challenge religious
discrimination while reducing attention to racial discrimination.
A closely divided
Court closed off the avenue for taxpayers to challenge the White House Office of FaithBased and Community Initiatives, which
plaintiffs had argued steered public funds to
21
affiliations.
political
strong
with
groups
The Supreme Court did hold onto one remnant of the old separatist view by
stressing that parents, not state actors, selected the religious schools from the range of
schooling options. 22 Now, the question left open is whether the federal Constitution

demands the inclusion of religious schools in a voucher program--or demands public aid
to facilitate the selection of parochial schooling, when public support is available for
other kinds of schooling. Now allowed by the Establishment Clause, are voucher
programs that encompass religious schools compelled even in cities and states that prefer
to confine school voucher programs to nonreligious schools? 23 Exclusion of religious
17. See e.g. Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Widmar, 454 U.S. 263. In each
instance, a public university or school had excluded religious groups from using the institution's space or
resources and explained such exclusions as efforts to avoid Establishment Clause violations, and in each case,
the Court rejected the Establishment Clause rationale, and found the exclusionary policies forms of
impermissible viewpoint discrimination, violating the free speech guarantee of the Constitution. For an
argument that this equal treatment approach undermines the special significance of religion by equating
religious expression with any other kind of expression, see Davis, supra n. 16, at 235-36.
18. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
19. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandments Display, Bar Others, N.Y. Times Al (June 28,

2005).
20. Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Reshapes Its Civil Rights Mission, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/
washington/14discrim.html?ei=5088&en=58a474d3b5dc75df&ex=1 339473600&partner=rs&pagewanted=all
(June 14, 2007).
21. The Court ruled 5-4 that the challengers lacked standing to sue because the funds came from general
appropriations, not specific legislation. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). Two
members of the Court indicated that they would overturn the precedent authorizing taxpayers' suits in specific
Establishment Clause contexts. The practical effect of the decision will be to permit the executive to promote
funding to religious groups without judicial oversight. See Michael Kranish, Court Bars Suit on Faith-Based
Plan, Boston Globe Al (June 26, 2007). Each of the opinions in the case underscore the enforcement barriers
that accompany Establishment Clause challenges to the use of public appropriations.
22. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
23. See David Heim, Vouch for It?-School Voucher Plans and ReligiousSchools, Christian Cent. (July 29,
1998) (available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is-n21_vl15/ai_21043675/pg 1). The Florida
Supreme Court declined to embrace similar free exercise arguments offered to defend the country's first
statewide school choice program; the Florida Opportunity Scholarships violated the state constitution's

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 9
TULSA LA WRE VIEW

[Vol. 42:911

schools from public aid looked not only permissible but required when the base-line was
strict separation between religion and government across all kinds of settings; but now
that public bodies can fund vouchers redeemable at religious schools, the exclusion of
religious schools from local schemes may come to be seen as an expression of unfair
discrimination or impermissible animus.

III.

PUZZLE

II: RESPECTING

PRECEDENT WHEN THE COURT REVERSES A PRECEDENT

The second puzzle arises from the continually difficult subject of stare decisis:
When should and when must a court adhere to its prior decisions, given the competing
goods of predictability-which enhances liberty, fairness, and the rule of law 24-and
flexibility due to changing circumstances and evolving understandings of justice? An
acute version of Puzzle Two emerges when the Supreme Court reverses a precedent;
then, in the name of stare decisis, how strongly should courts adhere to and extend a new
judges pace doctrinal
decision reversing prior precedent, and how much instead should
25
change by adhering to prior precedents in neighboring areas?
This puzzle is especially evident since the recent treatment of the Establishment
Clause, which one commentator describes as "the crumbling wall of separation between
church and state," 26 a collapse increasingly permitting public aid to religious schools. In
1997, the Court overturned an earlier decision that forbade publicly paid teachers to go
onto parochial school premises to teach remedial reading and instead ruled that even
direct aid to a religious school could comply with the Establishment Clause. 2 7 A
plurality opinion in 2000 produced a dramatically different analysis that would permit
public resources to reach religious schools as long as the aid itself would be secular and
would proceed in a neutral manner, available to public and private, secular and religious
schools, 2 8 but this view did not persuade a majority of the Court. Other Justices writing
"uniformity" clause guaranteeing all state students a "uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system
of free public" education. See Lisa Knepper, Florida Supreme Court Strikes Down School Choice,
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/florida/l_5_06pr.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2006).
24. See Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality) ("Liberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt.").
25. An external perspective on the Supreme Court would of course emphasize the effects of changing
membership on the stability of precedent. So would a journalistic perspective. See Linda Greenhouse & David
D. Kirkpatrick, Justices Loosen Ad Restrictions in Campaign Law, N.Y. Times Al, A18 (June 26, 2007); Linda
Greenhouse, Vote Against Banner Shows Divide on Speech in Schools, N.Y. Times A18 (June 26, 2007)
(relating revision of 2003 decision to changing Court membership). For a cogent discussion about internalist
and extemalist perspectives, see Mark Tushnet, Review: The New Deal Constitutional Revolution: Law,
Politics, or What? 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1061 (1999).
26. Amit Patel, The Orthodoxy Opening Predicament: The Crumbling Wall of Separation between Church
and State, 83 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 195 (2006). Another author asserts that a recent decision "razed the wall"
between Church and State. Jason S. Marks, Only a "Speed Bump " Separating Church and State? 57 J. Mo.
Bar I (Jan.-Feb. 2001) (available at http://www.mobar.org/joumal/2001/janfeb/marks.htm) (discussing how the
plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms would overrule both the result and the reasoning of Meek v. Pittingerand
Wolman v. Walter,dispense with the long-standing distinction between indirect government aid (permitted) and
direct government aid to religious institutions (forbidden), and focus solely on whether "the aid itself has an
impermissible content" rather than whether it allows funds to be diverted to support religious practice or
indoctrination). Justices Scalia and Thomas are ready to overturn other precedents in the religion context. See
e.g. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
27. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overturning Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
28. See generally Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793. The Court had already reopened an older case and reversed
course, permitting federally funded remedial instruction to take place on the site of a parochial school. See
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separately urged retention of key elements of the separationist doctrinal inquiry into
whether the government is impermissibly giving direct aid to religious practice or
indoctrination. 29 In 2002, a full majority of the Court upheld a city program funding
school vouchers used primarily in religious schools,30 but the opinion for the Court
included many qualifications, confining the decision to retain elements of the
separationist view. Commentators since have understandably disagreed whether these
cases amount to revolutionary change or small nuances. 3 1
The decisions leave
unanswered basic questions about the relationship between public funding and religious
schools, including whether a public funding program must include religious schools
when other schools are eligible, 32 and whether adherence to the new precedents ends the
rigorous scrutiny associated with the separationist approach and replaces it with a neutral

treatment analysis.
However these questions will be resolved, the Court and commentators will be
reacting to the confusion created by prior legal doctrine. The older precedents direct
judicial inquiry, first announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman,33 into whether the government
aid directly and impermissibly funds religious practice or indoctrination, or instead
permissibly provides indirect assistance, allows individuals to choose religious programs,
or supports solely secular activities without shifting fungible funds to religious activities.

Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (reversing prior judgment in Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402, and its companion case, Sch. Dist.
of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)).
29 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
30. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. Many factors contributed to the Supreme Court's approval of the voucher
scheme in Zelman:
1) it covered only disadvantaged students;
2) in a dismally failing public school district;
3) it included genuine secular options;
4) it offered no financial incentives for selecting the religious schools over other options; and
5) it offered public aid only indirectly, after parents selected the religious school
Id. at 662. And Justice O'Connor, while not confining her vote in the five-person majority to the reasons stated
in her concurring opinion, did additionally emphasize these features:
6) the support that the Cleveland voucher program provides religious institutions support is not
substantial and that is not atypical of other existing government programs.
Id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is far from clear why the first two factors offer any resolution of the
religious clause questions, even though they well explain by the political support for the voucher program and
some of the motivation for change in judicial resistance to aid to religious schools.
31. Compare Barbara Bradley Hagerty, ADF a Force behind Conservative Court Victories,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-4633563 (Sept. 10, 2007) (Jordan Lorance of Alliance
Defense Fund sees "180-degree change" in the Supreme Court's treatment of Establishment Clause challenges)
with Richard E. Morgan, The Failure of the Rehnquist Court, Claremont Inst. 3 (Spring 2006) (available at
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.l007/article_detail.asp) (seeing only small course corrections in
Establishment Clause cases).
32. The public funding may be for tuition vouchers or instead it may take the form of a tax credit. Further
questions arise when the school options include public charter schools organized as religious schools. See
Mary Elizabeth Hill Hanchey, Resisting Efforts to Provide Public Fundingfor ParochialEducation in Wake of
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: A Primerfor North Carolina Advocates, 1 First Amend. L. Rev. 85, 104-10
(2003) (considering how possible creation of publicly-chartered religious schools raises the problem of direct
aid to parochial school on a per-pupil basis; revising the charter school to give funding to parents who then
choose the religious charter schools could avoid constitutional problem).
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Using these inquiries, the Supreme Court produced a notoriously inconsistent set of
decisions interpreting the Establishment Clause, 34 while states and localities tested these
legal limits and tried to accommodate parents selecting religious schools.
Justices O'Connor and Breyer reinforced these precedents and the Lemon test in
supplying the crucial votes requiring the inclusion of religious schools in the public
subsidy program at issue in Mitchell v. Helms.35 There, Justices O'Connor and Breyer
reasoned that while neutrality in the sense of evenhandedness and secular content are
relevant to Establishment Clause inquiries, a program would remain defective if it
permitted diversion of resources to give direct support to religious indoctrination, or
lacked the intervention of a private individual choosing to use the resources for that
purpose. 36 The four other members of the Court who agreed with this result pushed
instead for the new test for government neutrality in offering aid of secular content; this
would suffice, in their view, to satisfy the Establishment Clause and no court would need
to ask whether aid reaches schools that are pervasively sectarian or whether the aid
allows religious schools to divert funds to purely religious activities. 37 Laying the
ground for the Court's later decision to permit inclusion of religious schools in a voucher

program, the plurality opinion reasoned that "if the government, seeking to further some
legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all

who adequately further that purpose,.

. .

then it is fair to say that any aid going to a

38
religious recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular purpose."

When the full Court majority, over four dissents, later approved the school voucher
program, the crucial concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor still preserved the
distinction between direct and indirect aid-and emphasized that the program placed the
government aid in the hands of parents, who then could make their own choice of
34. Over a dozen Supreme Court cases between 1968 and 2005 address public aid to nonpublic education in
light of the religion clauses. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein & Mark V. Tushnet,
ConstitutionalLaw 1531 (5th ed., Aspen 2005). Seeking to stop public aid from supporting a pervasively
religious institution, the Court disallowed: Aid to parochial schools for supplementing salaries of teachers of
secular subjects; aid for counseling, testing, and psychological services, speech and hearing therapy; teaching
and related services tax credits for low-income parents and tax deduction for high-income parents each sending
their children to parochial schools; and reimbursement of costs involved in administered state tests at parochial
schools. See Meek v. Pittlnger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Comm. for Pub. Edu. v. Nyquest, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Levitt v. Comm. for Pub, Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. The notion of strict separation
reflected both a kind of anti-contamination principle and also a practical economic idea that relieving the
burden of the secular activities from the religious school's budget so remaining funds could be devoted to
religious activities. The Court over the same time period permitted public aid in the form of secular textbooks
loaned to parochial schools, public school personnel administering at neutral sites diagnostic tests and services
for parochial school students; and reimbursement of costs associated with state-mandated tests. Comm. for
Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Bd.of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968).
concurring).
35. 530 U.S. at 836 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ.,
36. Id.at 840-44.
37. Id.at 801. Here the plurality marked a transition, using elements of the test from Lemon, 403 U.S. 602,
while moving toward an equal treatment approach. Establishing the line between permitted and forbidden
government support benefiting parochial schools proved difficult to draw, as did the relationship between
forbidden and required accommodation of religious free exercise. The Lemon test inspired so many criticisms
that one author announced, "Lemon is Dead." Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 795 (1993). By 1993, five members of the Supreme Court condemned the Lemon test. See Lamb's
Chapel v. C. of Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399-400 (1993) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring).
38. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810.
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religious or secular schools. 39 Since the deciding vote was cast by a Justice who is no
longer on the Court, the status of these distinctions to future Establishment Clause
This period of change and transition on the Court signals
analysis remains in doubt.
shifting political and moral views as well as changing legal doctrine, with inevitable
dialogue between past and present without generating a new dominant view.41
Changes in judicial treatment of the Free Exercise Clause have been if anything
more sweeping. The Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith completely
replaced strict scrutiny with a rational basis analysis of generally applicable laws. 42 Yet
even the new Free Exercise analysis does not answer how to treat a scheme, ostensibly
general, that substantially skews private choices toward religious schools. 43 Such a
scheme could raise Establishment Clause concerns about government action that a
reasonable observer would view as a governmental endorsement of religion in general or
of a particular religion. 44 When combined with the still uncertain scope of the changing

39. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 672 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, whose vote was necessary for
the majority, wrote separately and emphasized that "Cleveland parents who use vouchers to send their children
to religious private schools do so as a result of true private choice" from an array including nonreligious public
and community schools. Id.
40. For a prediction, see Joseph N. Knippenberg, John Roberts on Church and State: A Speculative
Reconstruction, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/knippenberg/05/roberts.htm (last updated Aug. 2005).
41. Cf Tribe, supra n. 1, at 25 (describing shifting views about sex roles and parenting, without a
crystallizing moral consensus).
42. Compare Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (halting heightened scrutiny to the government's refusal to grant
exemptions to generally applicable laws that unintentionally burden religious beliefs or practices) with
Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (requiring strict scrutiny of employment compensation rule which failed to
accommodate an individual who observed the Sabbath on Saturday).
43. The possibility that financial incentives would skew private choices toward the religious option
concerned even the Court's majority in Zelman, where the Justices in the majority simply concluded that the
array of choice and financial terms produced no such impermissible effect. 536 U.S. at 622-23.
44. In Zelman, 536 U.S. at 654-55, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion dealt with an objection on this
ground by indicating the facts did not support it:
Respondents suggest that even without a financial incentive for parents to choose a religious school,
the program creates a "public perception that the State is endorsing religious practices and beliefs."
But we have repeatedly recognized that no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of
private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous
independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of government
endorsement. The argument is particularly misplaced here since "the reasonable observer in the
endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware" of the "history and context" underlying a challenged
program. Any objective observer familiar with the full history and context of the Ohio program
would reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed
schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor introduced the reasonable observer perspective to assess such
skewing and also to assess when the government impermissibly endorses religion. See e.g. Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), for example, we unanimously
held that the State may, through a generally applicable financial aid program, pay a blind student's
tuition at a sectarian theological institution. The Court so held, however, only after emphasizing
that "vocational assistance provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student,
who transmits it to the educational institution of his or her choice." The benefit to religion under the
program, therefore, is akin to a public servant contributing her government paycheck to the church.
We thus resolved the conflict between the neutrality principle and the funding prohibition, not by
permitting one to trump the other, but by relying on the elements of choice peculiar to the facts of
that case: "The aid to religion at issue here is the result of petitioner's private choice. No reasonable
observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a
religious practice or belief."
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interpretation of the Establishment Clause, developments in Free Exercise doctrine
further complicate the task of a court determined to follow precedent strictly. 45 Which
line should remain fixed in the judicial decision-making: The line outlawing general aid
programs that exclude religious schools, or the line rejecting government policies that
push people into religion?
The Court has made room for greater public support of religious institutions than
in the past, but left uncertain when such public support ought to be compelled, and if so,
whether the governing theory would be Free Exercise of religion (because exclusion
from public resources would unduly burden such private exercise), or instead Free
Speech (forbidding viewpoint discrimination) or Equal Protection (forbidding
discrimination on the basis of religion). If viewpoint discrimination and equal protection
provide a basis for challenging the exclusion of religious groups from public support,
prior decisions treating religion differently from other subjects would also be cast in
doubt. 46 The ripples of change from revisions in religion doctrines spill over into other
areas of constitutional analysis without an obvious stopping point for constitutional
change.
IV.

PUZZLE III: FEDERALISM

The third puzzle involves federalism, a term whose own ambivalent legal meaning
hints at the tension. Federalism-a system of governing divided between central and
local authorities-can emphasize decentralization, with national authority committed to
recognizing and at many points deferring to state and local governments. But federalism
can also stress the significance of the central government as the overarching system,
binding the states and localities into a whole and requiring their acceptance of the
national government as the supreme and final authority. The two meanings of federalism
reflect the dual faces of the two-tiered governance system in the United States: On the
one hand, the division of sovereign authority into state and federal governments is meant
to advance liberty and democracy by spreading power and maintaining multiple forums
for popular participation; on the other hand, the supremacy accorded to federal law is
intended to produce coherence and uniformity on subjects of sufficient importance or in
sufficient need.
Again, the issues surrounding school vouchers provides a current disputed context
for working out the choice between federal uniformity and respect for state and local
Id. (citations omitted).
45. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Frank S. Ravitch, Locke v. Davey and the Lose-Lose
Scenario. What Locke Could Have Said, but Didn 't, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 255 (2004).
46. See Gerald E. Dempsey & Janet N. Petsche, Library Law: Does the FirstAmendment Allow Librariesto
Limit the Public Use of Their Property? http://www.mls.lib.il.us/ennounce/librarylaw/librarylaw 1I 06.pdf
(Oct. 26, 2006). To be fair, doubt may already be present on the viewpoint discrimination front. Compare
Faith C. ChurchEvangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 462 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2006) (approving library's decision
to deny use of its meeting room for worship services) with DeBoer v. Village of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 574
(7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting city policy excluding as viewpoint discrimination and characterizing prayer session as
civic event). Whether government can treat religion differently from other activities gives rise to questions
about levels of Equal Protection scrutiny and sufficient governmental interests. In Locke, the Court rejected the
student's request for strict scrutiny of the exclusion of religious training from the state scholarship program.
540 U.S. 712. Absent such a decision, government actors will be hard-pressed to comply with the
Establishment Clause.
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control. That choice is on a collision course in some jurisdictions: Federal constitutional
interpretation increasingly frowns on the exclusion of religious schools from public
funding available to other secular private schools, while some states forbid any public
aid to religious schools. Some state and local governments do not merely choose not to
fund religious instruction; their state constitutions prohibit public aid to religious
schools, and in some cases, to any religious institution. 4 7 Many of these state provisions
in part or in whole followed the failed effort of Congressman James Blaine to amend the
federal Constitution. 48 Because James Blaine and many of his supporters expressed antiCatholic views in support of restricting aid to religious institutions, many critics argue
that state prohibitions are indelibly marred by anti-Catholic hostility.4 9

The four

members of the Supreme Court ready to revise the Establishment Clause test in 2000
were also ready to overturn a state constitution Blaine Amendment. 50 The full Court has
not ruled on the issue-yet.

So the question remains open: Must federal constitutional views of religious
liberty, equal protection, and freedom of expression trump state constitutional bans on

47. More than two-thirds of the states limit public funding of religious schools or similar kinds of support.
See Thomas Berg et al., School Vouchers: Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes, http://pewforum.org/issues/
files/VoucherPackage.pdf (Nov. 2002).
48. For analyses of these "Blaine Amendments," see Richard Fossey & Robert LeBlanc, Vouchers for
Sectarian Schools after Zelman: Will the First Circuit Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in the Massachusetts
Constitution? 193 Educ. L. Rptr. 343 (2005); Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va.
L. Rev. 117, 123 n. 32 (2000) (identifying the influence of the federal proposal on 29-33 state provisions). See
also The Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty, Blaine Amendments: States, http://www.blaineamendments.org/
states/states.html (2003) (linking to provisions in thirty-seven state constitutions). For assessments of the
provisions-which include potential thirty-seven state constitutions---compare Kyle Duncan, Secularism's
Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (2003) (describing and
criticizing 37 state provisions) with Steven K. Green, "Blaming Blaine": Understanding the Blaine
Amendment and the "No-Funding" Principle,2 First Amend. L. Rev. 107 (2003) (defending the provisions).
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty has organized a series of legal challenges to state restrictions on funding
religious institutions. See e.g. The Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty, Becket Fund Challenges South Dakota
Blaine Amendment, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/90.html (Apr. 24, 2003) (describing Pucket v.
Hot Springs Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 120233 (Jan. 17, 2006)).
49 See e g. Joseph P. Viteretti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, The Constitution, and Civil Society 18,
152 (Brookings Instn. Press 1999); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 First
Amend. L. Rev. 85, 96 (2003). See generally Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 193-251
(Harvard U. Press 2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman 's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers,
and the Next Round of ConstitutionalBattles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917 (2003).
50. The plurality opinion directly rejected state Blaine amendments in these terms:
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to
disavow. Although the dissent professes concern for "the implied exclusion of the less favored," the
exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from government-aid programs is just that, particularly
given the history of such exclusion. Opposition to aid to "sectarian" schools acquired prominence
in the 1870's with Congress's consideration (and near passage) of the Blaine Amendment, which
would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian institutions. Consideration of the
amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general,
and it was an open secret that "sectarian" was code for "Catholic." Notwithstanding its history, of
course, "sectarian" could, on its face, describe the school of any religious sect, but the Court
eliminated this possibility of confusion when it coined the term "pervasively sectarian"-a term
which, at that time, could be applied almost exclusively to Catholic parochial schools and which
even today's dissent exemplifies chiefly by reference to such schools.
In short, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools
from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine,
bon of bigotry, should be buried now.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29 (citations omitted).
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aid to religious schools, where the state or locality offers support to secular schools?
Should this be a moment of national supremacy, elevating the emerging constitutional
commitments to equal protection and against viewpoint discrimination over state
concerns about advancing religion with public aid? Or should state constitutional
provisions restricting public aid to religious institutions trigger the federal Constitution's
limits on federal government interference with the states? This doctrinal puzzle has
51
given rise to much scholarly debate and ongoing litigation.
The usual conclusion would be federal supremacy in the face of direct conflicts
with state law. 52 The federal and state norms are on a collision course but the collision
has not yet happened; the federal courts have not connected the dots between decisions
permitting parents to use public vouchers to select religious schools 53 and forbidding
54
exclusion of religious groups from public funding otherwise generally available.
Courts presented with the problem have ducked it thus far because the specific federal
norm governing funding for religious schools remains unclear; courts may also approach
the religion and equality issues cautiously to avoid a show down between the federal and
state governments. Ironically, during the nineteenth century, the federal government
actually made bans on public aid to religious institutions a condition of statehood in
some instances. 55 Currently, states may experiment with voucher plans that include
religious schools; the Cleveland plan had enough features and conditions to pass muster,
but other plans may not.56 So federal law has not been construed definitively to require
inclusion of religious schools in public funding schemes. Given the "play in the joints"
between Establishment and Free Exercise demands, federal constitutional commitments
could permit a state to accord vouchers or scholarships to religious schools, but not
57
compel it to do so.
But problems would persist even if a Supreme Court majority fully announces a
federal norm that religious schools must be included in any public funding available to
secular schools. The chief difficulty even in the face of a squarely presented conflict
between federal and state norms is discerning which norm is more protective of
individual rights. The axiom that federal constitutional supremacy should overtake any
conflicting state rules is nowhere more welcome and acclaimed than in overcoming state
discrimination against minority groups. Yet the bans on public aid to religious schools
do not necessarily reflect discrimination against a minority group. Many state

51. See e.g. Pew Forum, Separation of Church and States: An Examination of State Constitutional Limits
on Government Fundingfor Religious Institutions, http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventlD=45 (Mar.
28, 2003).
52. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). The state courts, though, can be a guardian of federal
constitutional protection when challenged by state constitutions. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373
(1967) (affirming Supreme Court of California judgment ruling that State constitutional amendment initiative
erasing statutory protection against racial discrimination in housing denied equal protection of laws under
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
53. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
54. Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841.
55. See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins,
Scope, and FirstAmendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 551, 573 (2003).
56 Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
57. Compare Locke, 540 U.S. 712 with Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. See also Steven K. Greene, Locke v. Davey
and the Limits to Neutrality Theory, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 913 (2004).
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restrictions pre-dated the Blaine initiative; others drew diverse support as ways to protect
the conscience of minority religious groups, including Catholics. States can mount
compelling interests in refraining from support to religious schools quite apart from any
historically anti-Catholic views. 58 So the elements of bad motive at most would tarnish
only some of the state restrictions and even these could well have independent
compelling justifications-such as avoiding religious strife-that would save them from
this objection.
Moreover, it is not clear whether the ban on support for religious schools is less or
more protective of liberty than compelled inclusion of such schools in public aid
programs. 59 The truism that states can be more but not less protective of constitutional
rights than the federal government does not obviously point in one direction here.
Consider which stance is more protective of federal constitutional rights:
1) Strict separation of religion and government, and strict scrutiny
for free exercise; or
2) Government neutrality toward religious and secular activities,
requiring no separation, and requiring no accommodation from
generally applicable laws?

60

The first view-which until recently was the federal constitutional framework and
remains the standard in many states-finds harms to individual liberty when government
mixes with religion or fails to accommodate religious practice as harms to liberty-and
hence strictly prohibits public aid to religious institutions while energetically advancing
individual free exercise through exemptions from burdening laws. 61 This view urges

58. See Green, supra n. 48, at 113-28, 135-43; Marc D. Stem, Blaine Amendments, Anti-Catholicism, and
Catholic Dogma, 2 First Amend. L. Rev. 153, 166-203 (2003). In Divided by God, Noah Feldman argues that
conflicts among adherents of different religions-not simple hostility toward Catholicism-produced state bans
on funding religion in schools, and advocates maintaining such bans while allowing more room for public
displays of religious symbols. Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America's Church-StateProblem-And What
We Should Do about It (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2004). Alan Wolfe treats this view as audacious and
historically plausible, but politically and normatively problematic, because even this compromise treats
different religions differently: Those making symbols important benefit, while the ban on public aid hurts
religious that rely on institutions, like schools and hospitals, more than others that do not. Alan Wolfe, The
State of the Church-StateDebate, http://www.slate.com/id/2123459/ (Aug. 1, 2005).
59. A recent work, for example, argues that religious liberty calls for public aid to any school that the
government accepts for purposes of the compulsory school laws-but also calls for government regulation to
ensure students learn how to rationally reflect on their religious training. See generally Ian MacMullen, Faith
in Schools? Autonomy, Citizenship, and Religious Education in the Liberal State (Princeton U. Press 2007).
This prescription would enhance the liberty of parents who want to select religious schools and the liberty of
students to become equipped to choose their religious beliefs, but would undermine the liberty of those who
want to give no aid to religious instruction and those who want to protect religious instruction from state
regulation and rational skepticism.
60. These two positions do not exhaust the possibilities. See Kathleen Sullivan, The New Religion and the
Constitution, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1397 (2003); see also the discussion of Sullivan's taxonomy in the text
accompanying infra n. 67.
61. The federal version of this position prevailed when the Court embraced the standards of Lemon, 403
U.S. 602, and Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398. This view-strong separation and strong accommodation-persists in
states. Through state constitutional provisions or statues, thirty-seven states forbid public aid to religious
schools; some go further and forbid aid to religious institutions. See Berg, supra n. 47 (summarizing state
provisions); see e.g Fla. Const., art. 1, § 3 ("No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution."); Mass. Const., art. XVIII, § 2.
[N]o grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of public credit shall be made
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separation between religion and government in order to protect both; it seeks to protect
religious adherents from government pressures and government from religious pressure.
It also is meant to protect the liberty of individuals who do not affiliate with religious
groups seeking the funds or with any religious group, and to protect everyone from
potentially divisive and irreconcilable struggles over public resources. In light of
historical lessons from religious conflict, renewed by current events around the world,
and religious mobilization permeating U.S. politics, 62 the wisdom of a constitutional
commitment to separate public resources from religiously-inspired politics seems
enduring.
Yet, a second view treats exclusion of religion from public benefits as the greater
harm to liberty, and hence embraces neutrality as the watchword to measure both
acceptable government involvement in religion and refusals to exempt individuals from
general laws that may burden their religious exercise. Analogizing religions to racial
minorities, advocates of this view emphasize historical discrimination against Catholics
or other sects and warn against inadvertent as well as deliberate exclusions. Excluding a
specific religion or religion in general echoes past disapproval.
63
The two views remain alive in debates among advocates, judges, and justices.
To further complicate matters, scholars suggest that the ban on public aid to religious
schools reflects a theological rather than a neutral position. 64 Judges and advocates can
be excused for feeling dizzy if asked to discern the floor of federally-guaranteed
freedom. Now, it becomes a challenging methodological and substantive question:
should the remnant of the separatist view be the guide or instead should the neutrality
test govern? Is the required minimum federal permission to include religious schools in
public aid or federal mandate to include religious schools in public aid? Which should
be the "floor" of required liberty?
If minimally mandated religious freedom and government impartiality means

or authorized by the commonwealth or any political division thereof for the purpose of founding,
maintaining or aiding any other school or institution of leaming, whether under public control or
otherwise, wherein any denominational doctrine is inculcated, or any other school, or any college,
infirmary, hospital, institution, or educational, charitable or religious undertaking which is not
publicly owned and under the exclusive control, order and superintendence of public officers or
public agents.
Id. After the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act-Congressional effort to reestablishing the strict-scrutiny test for potential burdens from general legislation on religious free exercisetwelve states formally passed state laws to ensure in state matters the application of the "compelling interest
test" in religious freedom cases (AL, AZ, CT, FL, ID, IL, NM, OK, PA, RI, SC, and TX). Seven more states
judicially established a "compelling interest test" for application of state law (KS, MA, MN, OH, VT, WA, WI,
and MI). See Christopher J. Klicka, State Religious Freedom Acts, http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/
000000/00000083.asp (Jan. 28, 2003). For efforts to work through some related issues, see Thomas C. Berg,
State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private andPublic Education, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 531 (1999); W. Cole
Durham, Jr., State RRFAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 665 (1999);
Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21
Cardozo L. Rev. 595 (1999).
62. The familiar divisions over abortion and same-sex marriage are now joined by religious mobilization
around global warming and poverty.
63. See Knippenberg, supra n. 40 (discussing shifts in treatment of religion without a new dominant view).
64. See Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 First Amend. L. Rev. 45 (2003).
Similarly complicating is the religious dimension of the early movements for public schooling in Amenca. See
e.g. Charles Glenn, The Myth of the Common School (Institute Contemporary Stud. 2002).
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keeping public support away from religious schools, then states should be able to choose
whether to include religious schools in public support programs. Future decisions may
require inclusion of religious organizations in federal aid programs, but that still would
not answer what the states must do.6 5 Greater freedom does not necessarily come by
mandating inclusion of religious programs in state and local public aid. Indeed, the
benefits of variety and flexibility afforded by a federalist system may look especially
welcome for navigating these difficult issues. The federalist structure has long been
celebrated for permitting the states to serve as laboratories of social experimentation,
encouraging local political engagement, checking concentrated power, and according
latitude for the states to strike their own solutions to hard problems. 66 That, of course,
would require accepting varied answers across the country and contrasts between what
federal and state laws prescribe, exposing the tension between federal supremacy and
state autonomy. But that flexibility may be helpful as each level of government, in
different regions of the country, with different constellations of religious groups, tries to
comply with the federal constitutional requirements to refrain from either endorsing any
religions or disapproving them.
Reflecting on what the three puzzles share, I will also turn to policy considerations,
different ways to combine the puzzles, and the virtues of incremental constitutional
decision-making.
V.

A COMMON

DIFFICULTY: THE PROBLEMS OF ALL OR NOTHING

Each of these puzzles presents distinct difficulties; each comes into play now when
states and local schemes give aid to public and private schools but exclude religious
ones. As a further commonality, each of the puzzles presents a dilemma, with each
prong of the dilemma both compelling and unsatisfactory precisely because its selection
requires rejecting its alternate. Thus, the puzzling conjunction of the Free Exercise and
Establishment doctrines could lead government actors to accommodate free exercise at
the cost of government partiality toward religion or else to secure scrupulous government
distance from religion at the cost of disfavoring and burdening religious exercise. The
second puzzle invites judges to respect the recent precedent, overturning prior precedent,
but then the values of stability and predictability usually tied to precedent would justify
destabilizing much of the surrounding legal terrain; adhering to precedent in the
surrounding areas, in contrast, could require confining the new precedent to a narrow
foot-print, which then would cast into doubt the fidelity that stare decisis demands.
Federalism's Janus-faced tribute to state autonomy could lead courts to limit federal
uniformity and supremacy; full embrace of federal power would nullify state autonomy
and the decentralized variety that it enables. The courts must choose between federal
and state control in cases of direct collisions, but over time across different issues, the

65. See Stern,supra n. 58, at 157.
66. See e.g. A.E. Dick Howard, Federalism, in The Bill of Rights, the Courts, and the Law 335 (3d ed., U.
Va. Press 1999); A.E. Dick Howard, The Uses of Federalism: The American Experience, 8 Am. U. J. Intl. L. &
Policy 389 (1993). For a critical view of the scientific metaphors informing some defenses of American
federalism, see G. Alan Tarr, Laboratoriesof Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism,and Scientific Management,
31 J. Federalism 37 (2001).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

15

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 9
TULSA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:911

federal courts can build a portfolio of state control and federal control decisions.
Working through the relationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise
commitments of the First Amendment, it is possible to find more alternatives than a
strong view of one and a weak view of the other. A particular situation may call for a
solution responsive to the tugs from each direction. Kathleen Sullivan devised this
taxonomy showing four possible views, each a permutation of the potentially strong or
67
weak view of each of the constitutional clauses:
1) Ambitious judicial enforcement of both clauses: Strong judicial
enforcement of the Establishment Clause and strong judicial
enforcement of the Free Exercise clause, 6 8 treating religion like
a private expressive association deserving ample government
protection subject to the caveat that the government itself cannot
speak in a religious voice;
2) Restrained judicial review for both clauses: Weak judicial
enforcement of the Establishment Clause and weak judicial
enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause,69 treating religion as
an ordinary interest group, allowed to participate freely in
politics, gain advantage from political deals and spoils, but
secure no special advantage from judicial solicitude;
3) Strong separation of religion and government: Strong judicial
enforcement of the Establishment Clause and weak judicial
enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause, and viewing religion
as a quasi-government, with potential authority over its
members, but not deserving subsidy from the government or
protection from the rival secular government; and
4) Strong accomodation of religion: Weak judicial enforcement of
the Establishment Clause and strong enforcement of the Free
Exercise Clause, according religion a status like a discrete and
insular minority in need of special judicial protection and
accommodation even to the point of government involvement
with religion.
Two of these views-i and 3-would roll back the clock and rule against public aid to
schools even in the indirect form of vouchers if that means people are forced against
their consciences to pay taxes that support religious instruction. 70 The two remaining
positions-2 and 4-would be compatible with a government voucher program,
permitting parents to select religious schools, but only one of them, 4, would demand
courts to order inclusion of religious schools in a legislative or school board plan leaving
them out. All three other views would treat that solution as excessive and undue judicial
71
solicitude for religion on either Establishment or Free Exercise grounds.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Sullivan, supra n. 60.
This is comparable to option 1. Id. and accompanying text.
This is comparable to option 2. Id.
See Feldman, supra n. 58.
Working out precisely what doctrinal tests advance "weak" or "strong enforcement of each clause
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VI.

THE POLICY DIMENSIONS: PART OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS?

What none of these approaches detects, however, is a policy consideration that has
constitutional ramifications: The potentially deleterious effect on a diverse and
democratic society if, over time, the percentage of children attending private schools
increased from the usual ten percent 72 to approach a majority of the population. That
kind of shift would undermine the role of public schools as symbols of equality,
opportunity, unity, and democracy. 73 The vast majority of private schools in the United
States pursue specific religious missions, and by definition, they are not open to all nor
are they guided by the mission of public schools. A major exodus of students from
public to private schools would terminate the role of public schools in forging a shared
American experience and identity. The character of the nation itself is at stake if a
majority of students pursues that option. Recent experience in Great Britain indicates
difficulties ensuring that publicly-funded religious schools contribute to national
cohesion. 74 The potential risk from increasing private school student enrollments does
not present an all-or-nothing choice. Private schooling does and must persist as an
option in a nation that cherishes religious and parental freedom, and the U.S. Supreme
Court long ago recognized a parental right to select private schools as a means to comply
with a compulsory school law. 75 A green light to public funding of vouchers and tax
credits redeemable at parochial schools raises, however, the subtle issue of a potential

remains another task. For efforts to work out consistent tests, see Feldman, supra n. 58; Abner S. Greene, The
Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause Doctrine, 21 Wash. U. J.L. & Policy 225 (2006).
72. U.S. Dept. of Educ., The Condition of Education 2007 25, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007064.pdf
(2007) (private school enrollments have hovered around ten percent). The lion share of these enrollments is in
religious schools. Over the past fifteen years, the distribution of students in private schools has shifted some,
with fewer in Catholic schools and growth in conservative Christian schools.
Although Roman Catholic schools continue to have the largest share of total private school
enrollment, the percentage decreased from 55 to 46 percent because of the decline in the percentage
of students enrolled in parochial schools (i.e., run by a parish, not by a diocese or independently).
On the other hand, the percentage of students enrolled in Conservative Christian schools increased
from 11 to 15 percent. In addition, there was an increase in the percentage of students enrolled in
nonsectarian private schools, from 13 to 18 percent. This change in distribution from Roman
Catholic to other religious and nonsectarian private schools occurred at both the elementary and
secondary levels.
Id.
73. Adam Cohen, A First Report Card on Vouchers, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1999/
04/19/vouchers.html (Apr. 19, 1999).
Public schools have long held the promise of being America's great equalizer, mixing students of
different races, classes and religions in a single student body. At their best, public schools have
united diverse groups of students, many of them immigrants, by passing on the nation's shared civic
heritage, from George Washington to George Washington Carver. Public schools have the ability to
teach democracy simply by being open to all children, and regarding them--and their backgrounds
and religions-as equally worthy. "Nobody claims private schools can't teach tolerance, mutual
respect and nondiscrimination," says Princeton political science professor Amy Gutmann. "But in
public schools, they are taught as much by the mixing of students as they are by the curriculum."
Id.
74. The Muslim News, Benefits of Religious Education Not Realized-UK Schools Watchdog,
http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=12900 (June 17, 2007) (reporting study by Office for
Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills about the effects of religious education in Great
Britain).
75. See Pierce, 269 U.S. 510.
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tipping point. 76 More individual families are likely to opt for private schools-and as
specific towns, cities, and states encourage such options through voucher programs and
other aid. The cumulative impact of individual family decisions could well alter the
character of schooling and socialization in America.
Patterns of socioeconomic and racial segregation in public schooling already
expose the distance between the ideal of the common school and the realities of U.S.
public schools as a vehicle for building a shared American experience and equal
opportunities for all students. 7 7 Some advocates of school vouchers claim that private
schools can better advance the critical thinking and social cohesion crucial to democracy
than public schooling now does. 78 But this speculation is unsupported by evidence about
the range of religious schools emerging in this country, and it is challenged by increased
racial and class segregation in privatized schooling in other countries. Moreover, unless
tightly regulated in content and admissions practices, private schools could neglect
critical thinking and tolerance altogether. Education expert Richard Kahlenberg
comments:
If we want students who think critically, do we really want parents to use public fuids to
educate their children at institutions handpicked to replicate the parents' private beliefs
(about, say, creationism) rather than to expose students to broader possibilities? If we want
to teach children what it means to be an American, do we want public funds to subsidize
private schools set up especially to appeal, say, to an Armenian population, or to those
seeking an Afrocentric curriculum? What
about schools that harden religious differences
79
rather than emphasizing commonality?
School choice-whether through magnet and charter schools within the public
system or encompassing private schools through voucher programs-can offer avenues
for voluntary racial and socio-economic integration, for experimentation, and for
competition, but it can also cream away from ordinary public schools the most motivated
families and crucial public and private resources. The politicized debate at the national
level and complex goals behind the reforms make fair evaluation of existing efforts
difficult. 80 Yet risks of social division, inconsistent standards, and diminished attention
76. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Little,
Brown & Co. 2000) (examining "social epidemics," or sudden and often chaotic changes from one state to
another).
77. Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare? http://www.eric.
ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage 01/0000019b/80/1 b/b8/82.pdf (Jan. 2004).
78. See generally Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteretti
eds., Yale U. Press 2003).
79. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Review: Good Schools, Good Citizens, Am. Prospect 37 (Mar. 25, 2002)
(available at http://www.equaleducation.org/commentary.asp?opedid=904).
80 See V. Dion Haynes, Congress Lifts Income Limit for Students in Evaluation, Wash. Post B04 (Dec. 12,
2006) (alteration in income-eligibility for participants in federal school voucher plan in District of Columbia
produces political disagreements and questions about evaluation); Lois Romano, GOP Unveils School Voucher
Plan, Wash. Post A17 (July 19, 2006) (noting party divisions over the plan); Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private
School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Q.J.
Econ. 553 (May 1998) (finding positive effects on math but not reading scores for participants); Ctr. for Policy
Alt., School Vouchers, http://www.stateaction.org/issues/issue.cfm/issue/SchoolVouchers.xml (accessed Sept.
13, 2007); Alan Krueger & Pei Zhu, Another Look at the New York City Voucher Experiment,
http://ers.princeton.edu/workingpapers/lers.pdf (Apr. 2003) (rejecting interpretation of study claiming large
improvement for voucher participants); Dan Lips & Evan Feinberg, School Choice: 2006 Progress Report,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/bgl970.cftm (Sept. 18, 2006).
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to critical thinking could result if religious schools come to educate 30%, 50%, or more
children across this diverse nation. Hence, decisions to exclude religious schools from
public school choice schemes can reflect judgments about educational concerns quite
apart from concerns about religious preference or entanglement.
If impact risk of social harm from a shift toward high levels of religious school
enrollments is foreseeable, what role should it play in constitutional analysis? Whether
characterized as the ethical strand of constitutional analysis, 8 1 or folded into
considerations directed by the doctrine, 82 consideration of the effects of a challenged law
or a proposed ruling can be an element of constitutional interpretation. Effects matter
not simply because constitutions ultimately are meant to serve societal purposes; effects
matter quite specifically in assuring the balance between Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise commitments embodied in the Bill of Rights, in protecting the complex
relationship between state and federal governments, and in maintaining respect for
precedent consistent with changing needs. Each of the puzzles associated with these
doctrines requires adjustments over time rather than once-and-for-all solutions; each
requires awareness of the effects of the Court's own actions.
The current Supreme Court does not, however, seem headed toward this approach
to constitutional method. Instead, prominent members of the Court have revived original
intent, literal textualism, and formalist doctrines, and the Court has been turning away
from consideration of the effects of a policy in assessing potential Establishment Clause
problems, without, however, devising a new dominant view. 83 Nothing in the language

81. Philip Bobbitt, ConstitutionalInterpretation 12-22 (Basil Blackwell, Inc. 1991).
82. The Lemon test traditionally included consideration of the effects of the challenged law on the
advancement or suppression of religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. Effects are not directly examined under the
emerging doctrinal inquiries that instead test whether the challenged law is neutral or whether a reasonable
observer would think that the law endorses religion. Yet even under these inquiries, effects can become
relevant-in assessing the baseline against which to check the law for neutrality and in assessing the effects a
reasonable observer would perceive to be associated with the law--especially if Justice O'Connor's
contributions to the emerging theory retain any force. See Rosenberger, 514 U.S. 819, 846 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 First Amend. L. Rev.
85 (2003) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-419221) (arguing that neutrality prevents government from
conditioning the receipt of social welfare benefits on religious affiliation (or lack thereof), but should not
generally prevent government from imposing secular conditions as terms of the benefits).
83. See Knippenberg, supra n 40. In Rosenberger, several justices clashed over their readings of the origin
of the amendments and their precursors in James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against a Virginia tax
levy for support of the established church and Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty. 515 U.S.
819. Justice Thomas read that history "simply as a prohibition on governmental preferences for some religious
faiths over others." Id. at 854 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Souter, in contrast, noted
that the bill subject to James Madison's critique itself would have funded religious and nonreligious schools,
and hence the objection at the time was directed to any governmental support of religion, even if offered
equally to other sects and secular establishments Id at 863 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to
Religion: A False Claim About OriginalIntent, 27 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 875 (1986).
Professor Tribe has cast doubt on the utility of looking to the intention of particular framers in
discerning enduring meaning of the religion clauses; he has emphasized the importance of keeping in mind the
differences between Jefferson's commitment to protect politics from religion and Madison's goal to protect
both spheres from one another. Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 1158-60 (2d ed., Foundation
Press 1988). His cautions about originalism in this context are especially well placed, since most of the
contemporary debate would not even have occurred without the Court's decision in 1947 to apply the First
Amendment to the states, through the then-innovative theory of incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Everson, 330 U.S. 1. Application of the First Amendment too looks quite different now, given
that several states had an official established church when the First Amendment was adopted. See Kathleen
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of the religion clauses offers relevant or specific guidance about whether to consider
social effects. It is striking, however, that past doctrinal interpretation of Free Exercise
and Anti-Establishment commitments has sustained precisely the pattern of ninety
percent public and ten percent private school enrollments that characterized American
kindergarten through twelfth-grade education for decades.
VII. PUTTING THE PUZZLES TOGETHER

Keeping in mind the question about whether and how likely effects of government
subsidies for religious schooling, putting the distinct puzzles together might be helpful.
Let us try by combining two at a time:
A.

Religion Clauses + Federalism

Courts could construe the Constitution's religion clauses to leave room for
localities and states to decide whether to subsidize religious schools in a larger aid
program. Such a conclusion--drawing together the religion clauses puzzle and the
federalism puzzle-would acknowledge that there are multiple ways to realize the
simultaneous commitments to ensure private religious freedom and protect both
government and religion from one another. 84 Precisely because different people
interpret the relations between the clauses differently, the courts should be wary about
foreclosing local choice. But this calls for reading the religion clauses with either
sufficient confidence to include policy concerns in interpreting the clauses or sufficient
85
humility to make room for democratic and state-level decision-making.
B.

Stare Decisis + Federalism

Thinking simultaneously about the puzzles of stare decisis and federalism can also
be helpful here. Both the tradition of deference to precedent in constitutional
interpretation and the Constitution's structural provisions offer crucial caution to put
brakes on rapid change. Those virtues would be welcome when courts consider state
constitutions forbidding public aid to religious schools-and also when local
governments themselves consider whether to follow Cleveland's sc.ool vouchers
initiative and expand public scholarships to private schools. 86 Adherence to precedent
when there is a recent decision reversing one line of cases should, in this spirit, point

Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw 1508 (15th ed., Foundation Press 2004).
84. Tribe, supran. 83, at 1158-60.
85. The second option resembles the minimalism advocated by Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time:
Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard U. Press 1999). He defends judicial decision-making
focused on reaching low-level, fact-drenched agreement on individual cases while leaving "fundamental issues
undecided." Id. Yet the shifting treatment of aid to religious schools, and the risk of a "tipping point" quickly
shifting school enrollments to private schools-may demand a very different judicial method, one attentive to
the cumulative impact of individual decisions. The large substantive and methodological competences for
pursuing such an approach may explain the paucity of support for this kind of constitutionalism quite as well as
the lack of textual grounding in the constitution.
86. Milwaukee, alongside Cleveland, initiated voucher programs that include religious schools. Evaluation
efforts have been as yet inconclusive. Natl. Educ. Assn., School Vouchers: The Emerging Track Record,
http://www.nea.org/vouchers/02voutrack.html (Apr. 2002); U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., School Vouchers: Publicly
FundedProgramsin Cleveland and Milwaukee, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-0 1-914 (Apr. 2002).
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broadly to the entire array of precedents, not simply the most recent reversal. In this
light, a voucher plan including religious schools is permitted-if parents are the circuitbreaker between public funding and the state, if there are many secular choices, if there
is a demonstrated history of public school failure 87-but the Constitution does not
compel inclusion of religious schools in a voucher or other public aid program.
C.

StareDecisis + Religion Clauses

A constitution devoted to ordered liberty should advance personal liberty
consistent with traditions of public order. In the context of potentially compelled public
aid to religious schools, courts could ask whether personal liberty lies with allowing state
bans on aid to religion, because these restrictions prevent the state from compelling any
taxpayer to aid a religious institution-or instead with equalizing financial incentives so
individuals who want to choose religious schooling for their children receive support just
as do those who elect secular public school? Each view offers a plausible claim as the
floor of minimum liberty, 88 so sheer invocation of individual liberty not does offer much
help here.
Stare decisis in the particular context of personal liberty, though, may offer some
help through the notion of individual and societal reliance. Adherence to older
precedents matters in the context of protections of personal liberty not simply as an
expression of familiar societal resistance to change, but also with due respect for the
individual and social practices that grow around the precedents, and the reliance that
these patterns reflect and in turn propel. This notion of individual and social reliance
animates the Supreme Court's adherence to precedent in Planned Parenthood of
90
89
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and reversal of precedent in Lawrence v. Texas.
In Casey, the joint opinion for a plurality of the Supreme Court justices reasoned that
reliance interests undergird judicial respect for precedent where personal liberty is at
stake. 9 1 That Casey opinion in turn informed the Court's majority in Lawrence when the
Court invalidated a Texas statute criminalizing intimate sex acts between members of the
same sex and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick. The Lawrence majority relied on Casey
both for the recognition of personal liberty under the due process clause and for the
caution "when a court is asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional
liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of that liberty cautions
92
with particular strength against reversing course."
In Casey, the Court stressed the reliance by individual women and society when it
resisted arguments for reversing Roe v. Wade's recognition of a women's fundamental
liberty to control reproduction through access to abortion:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Zelman, 536 U.S. 639; Agostini, 521 U.S. 203.
Id.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
505 U.S. 833.
539 U.S. 558, 577 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 855-56).
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society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should
fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives .... The
Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be
exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling 93Roe for people who have
ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.
Implicit here is reliance not only by women, but also by employers and families on the
availability of women to the labor force enabled by control over reproduction and childbirth. Also powerfully present, though perhaps less discussed, is the reliance by men,
who could count on the availability of abortion as a reason for engaging in sexual
intercourse with women without obligations to their female partners even when
contraception fails. Generationally-marked shifts not only in sexual relations but also in
dating, marriage, and family formation emerged, with both men and women ordering
their lives around the presumed availability of abortion. These practices in turn affected
the direction of advocacy efforts and public policy. As pro-choice advocates for women
and families invested in keeping abortion safe and legal, neither public policy nor civil
society developed alternative social and policy structures that would render women's
workforce participation compatible with child-bearing, despite the urging of cultural
feminists who envisioned
alternative structures--ones that are more hospitable not only to pregnant women but to
working parents. On a practical level, what that entails is a cluster of legal regulations, tax
incentives.., directed towards a cluster of issues: guaranteed leaves, job security, flexible
working schedules, part-time employment, and adequate child care. On a more theoretical
level, that agenda implies a broader commitment to traditional female values of
collaboration, co-operation, and care taking. Given the role constraints that have limited
male as well as female experience, both sexes have a stake in such a reconstructive
94
enterprise.

Some pro-life/anti-abortion advocates have supported the same or a very similar
vision. 95 But as most people relied on the social relationships enabled by Roe, neither
motivation nor action for such alternatives emerged. The Casey majority concluded that
reversing Roe would not alter the economic, social, and sexual mores that emerged
precisely because of legalized abortion; the Court concluded that reversal of precedent
there instead would simply leave women endangered and burdened.9 6

93. 505 U.S. at 856 (citations omitted). The Casey Court tried to distinguish two key reversals of
longstanding precedents because they reflected changes in facts or factual understandings. See id at 861-64
(discussing how West Coast Hotel rejected Lochner's view that unfettered economic markets meet human
needs and Brown v. Board of Education rejected Plessy's view that legal segregation does not produce racial
stigma for the minority group). This is a curious use of "fact" for in both cases the Court is looking behind
ideological claims and putting its own weight behind particular interpretations of social experience. On this
basis, advocates could claim that the Court should recognize as "fact" that the separationist approach to the
Establishment Clause produced stigmatizing exclusions of religious institutions from public aid.
94. Nancy Cott, What is Feminism? 157 (Juliet Mitchell & Ann Oakley eds., Pantheon Books 1986).
95. See Kerri-Ann Kiniorski, Work vs. Family, 5 Am. Feminist 3 (1998) (available at
http://www.feministsforlife.org/taf/1998/summer/Summer98.pdf).
96. See Catherine A. MacKimnnon, The Male Ideology of Privacy:A Feminist Perspective on the Right to
Abortion, 17 Radical Am. 23 (July-Aug. 1983) (viewing abortion from a male point of view, leaving women
unequal in reproductive and sexual choices).
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Social and economic practices have analogously grown up around the absence of
government support for religious schools in the United States. Religious communities
have devised their own ways to support these schools-including charitable giving,
reinforced by the federal tax code's charitable deduction provision. Those religious
schools that welcome people outside the religion also recruit scholarship funds from
broader sources. Rather than view these practices as happenstance and mere making-do,
constitutional analysts could understand this independence and self-reliance by families
and religious communities as crucially important to the vitality of religious life and civil
society in America-especially when compared with the European societies where both
97
government financed religious schools and fading religious communities are the norm.
State-run religious institutions in Europe lack autonomy and have been associated with
declining support among the populace. If all religious schools become dependent upon
state financial support, both their independence and ability to maintain private support
would be jeopardized.
Even more fundamentally, religious institutions and practices have evolved in the
United States in distinctive directions because of the separation of religion from public
schooling as well as the efforts of religious groups to include non-adherents in their own
schools. 98 The evolution of Catholic schools as vital urban institutions serving large
numbers of Protestant children of color-and the curricular commitments to ecumenism
and citizenship-reveal the reliance of Catholics and non-Catholics alike on the
emergence of religious schools as a distinct alternative to public schools. 99 So perhaps
ironically, it is the non-reliance on government that has made religious schools vibrant in
America-and judicially-mandated public support could endanger this tradition. 100 In
light of these complex patterns of individual and social reliance, the Lawrence majority
and Casey plurality would warn today's constitutional interpreters against construing the

97. See Steven Pfaff, The Religious Divide: Why Religion Seems to be Thriving in the United States and
Waning in Europe, in Jeffrey Kopstein & Sven Steimno, Growing Apart: America and Europe in the TwentyFirstCentury 24 (Cambridge U. Press 2007). Compare Harry Anthony Patrinos, Private Provision and Public
Finance:
Education
in
the
Netherlands,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/CHEPublication.nsf/0/
9f1 8f7b54fb3b98585256c2c005e2cc3/$FILE/Netherands%20Private%2Provision%20and%2Public%20Fi
nance.pdf (July 2002) with Christian Smith, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving (U. Chicago
Press 1998). The thriving Catholic institutions are particularly interesting, given the assertion that the Blaine
Amendments embody anti-Catholic animus. See Mary J. Oates, The Catholic Philanthropic Tradition in
America (Indiana U. Press 1995).
98. Some suggest that the separationist tradition has also contributed, perhaps ironically, to the strong role
of religious groups in American politics which in turn sustain distinctive American approaches to the state's
relationship with religion:
[A] secular state and a religious polity, they are contingently compatible in the sense that each
depends upon the other. Thus, we can have highly vocal and widely mobilized religious politics
precisely because there is a separation of church and state where the actual affairs of government
are concerned. At the same time, that same separation would be intolerable if there were not ample
opportunity elsewhere in the society to exercise and express one's religious preference-or lack of
one.
N.J. Demerath & Karen S. Straight, Religion, Politics, and the State: Cross-CulturalObservations, 47 Cross
Currents 16 (1997) (available at http://www.crosscurrents.org/Demerath.htm). See also N.J. Demerath & Rhys
H. Williams, A Bridging of Faiths. Religion and Politics in a New England City (Princeton U. Press 1992).
99. See generally Anthony Bryk, Valerie Lee & Peter Holland, Catholic Schools and the Common Good
(Harvard U. Press 1993).
100. Demerath & Straight, supra n. 98.
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religion clause and federalism precedents to mandate inclusion of religious schools in
programs providing public aid to secular schools. Caution is due especially now, as the
country journeys through shifting waters on the treatment of religion in public life. 10 1
Respect for stare decisis as a principle means respecting individual and social
reliance on past precedent. This means that a new precedent should not unleash rapid
expansion of the new development. Caution is especially warranted here, given the
many open questions in Establishment and Free Exercise jurisprudence and the risk of
the cumulative impact of greater numbers of students schooled in separate (and
potentially antagonistic) religious traditions. Together, stare decisis and the religion
clauses suggest that courts now should leave room for state-level experimentation and
variety rather than a uniform national solution on the issue of compelled public aid to
religious schools. 102 Because the ground rules of public funding shape the link between
schooling and an inclusive society and, in turn, the prospects for democratic vitality,
individual liberty, and mutual tolerance, the constitutional treatment of public aid to
religious schools should avoid radical and rapid shifts.
Hence, as the Supreme Court has directed, 10 3 courts should permit government
programs that choose to include religious schools within larger aid programs-if the
other conditions of individual choice or entirely secular content are met. But these new
precedents should not be read so aggressively as to require public support of religious
schools when states or localities pursue school choice reforms or other forms of school
aid. That requirement would demand considerably new readings of the Free Exercise
Clause, freedom of speech, or equal protection; such a requirement would overturn the
state constitutional provisions-by some counts, in thirty-seven states 10 4 banning direct
aid to religious schools.
Letting states and localities either include or exclude religious schools in general

101. See Andrew Sullivan, How FundamentalismIs Splitting the GOP: Crisis of Faith, 232 New Republic
16 (May 2, 2005); Richard Allen Greene, Religion and Politics in America, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/3658172.stm (last updated Sept. 15, 2004); Scott Keeter, Election '06: Big Changes in Some Key
Groups, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/93/election-06-big-changes-in-some-key-groups (Nov. 16, 2006); Pew
Forum, Religion and the 2006 Elections, http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DoclD=174 (accessed Mar. 3,
2008) (reporting findings of religiously-based political divisions from two previous Pew Research Center
analyses); Greg Smith et al., Religious Groups View the 2006 Election, http://pewresearch.org/
pubs/99/religious-groups-react-to-the-2006-election (Nov. 27, 2006). The trend is very recent or else social
scientists disagree about the trend. See Andrew Kohut et al., The Diminishing Divide: Religion's Changing
Role in American Politics (Brookings Instn. Press 2000). American political conflict over secular versus
religious values informed grassroots politics both before and after Roe v. Wade. See Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Har. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 373
(2007).
102. Cf. Sunstein, supra n. 85; Cass Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=880121 (Jan. 2006). A critic may condemn forms of judicial minimalism as unduly
conservative and complacent, see Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, andthe Minimalist: Review of One
Case at a Time, 89 Geo. L.J. 2297 (2001), but case-by-case consideration of issues on the cusp of conflictual
values and doctrines could instead be devoted to preserving dynamism.
103. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
104. The Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty, supra n. 48; The Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty, What Are Blaine
Amendments? http://blaineamendments.org/Intro/whatis.html (accessed Mar. 3, 2008). "The Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, interfaith, public interest law firm dedicated to protecting the free
expression of all religious traditions."
The Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty, About Us, http://
www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/82.html?PHPSESSID=deafed85c23elda5b30fe94ealele84b
(accessed
Mar. 3, 2008).
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aid programs also requires preserving the "play-in-the joints" between the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause. Preserving respect for precedents halting direct aid to
religious schools demands a cautious reading of recent judicial decisions so that both the
old and new decisions receive their due. Permitting states to experiment requires
forgoing the uniformity and conclusiveness of a single federal decision.
VIII. IN PRAISE OF PARTICULARIZED INCREMENTALISM

The puzzles addressed here remain puzzling. I take heart from the surprising
convergence in the analysis offered here with Larry Tribe's analysis of his three linked
riddles. Although he addressed the very difficult puzzles of childhood, suspect
classifications, and conclusive presumptions, he concluded that individualized judgments
about equality claims about particular children offered the best avenue for navigating the
difficulties he examined, especially in a period of moral flux. 105 Similarly, I conclude
here that the Supreme Court should resist an across-the-board solution and allow
individual states either to ban funding of religious schools or to include those schools in
general funding programs.
Even more affirming of the approach taken here are Professor Tribe's reflections in
his grand treatise about constitutional and historical change. The Constitution is binding
but its meaning must reflect a "historically connected set of processes," and "deep
puzzles of continuity and linkage;"' 1 06 each new generation becomes "not only auditors
but authors of our own constitutional rules and limits,",10 7 including the choice to
remain--or not to remain-faithful to the Constitution. 108 Shifts in historical practices
can expose doctrinal categories as artificial and in need of change. 10 9

No doubt

cognizant of the irony, Professor Tribe turns to the historic authority of Justice Oliver
Wendell

Holmes, Jr., to acknowledge

the

inevitable

contribution

of present-day

interpreters to the meaning and terms of the Constitution:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the Constitution of
the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a

105. See Tribe, supra n. 1, at 35. Tribe argues that some age-based rules should give way to rebuttal through
individualized hearings if the rule involves "(1) the deprivation of liberties ordinarily deemed fundamental and
(2) the presence of moral transition-at least if coupled with self-preserving institutional unresponsiveness."
Id. at 35. Again, with parallels to the inquiry here, Tribe embraces "tentative, ad hoc approaches" where
questions seem unanswerable at present so that courts may "facilitate, and take part in, the evolution of
moral-and thus legal-consensus." Id. at 36-37.
106. Laurence Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 21 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2000).
107. Id.at 24.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 70 (discussing interpretations of the Commerce Clause). For Professor Tribe, encounters with
social, technological, and legal change should turn the search for constitution continuity reaches to general
purposes and goals. While acknowledging new constitutional questions posed by the interet and computers,
Professor Tribe wrote: "The text used by the Constitution's authors and ratifiers does not exhaust the values our
Constitution recognizes," and he proposed a new amendment to convey that "[t]he technologies familiar to the
Constitution's authors and ratifiers similarly do not exhaust the threats against which the Constitution's core
values must be protected." Laurence H. Tribe, Keynote Address, The Constitution in Cyberspace (Burlingame,
Cal., Mar. 26-28, 1991) (emphasis in original) (available at http://www.sjgames.com/SS/tribe.html).
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century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not
110
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.

Thus, concludes Tribe, "any interpretive method necessarily reflects the embrace of
some substantive values not necessarily and unambiguously enacted by the constitutional
text."1 11 Surely this method would push for consideration of the cumulative effects of
its own applications, and resist the calls completely to segregate legal doctrine and
policy. 112 Constitutional doctrine is not a straight-jacket but instead a tool for
addressing complex difficulties in light of past resolutions of potentially analogous
difficulties, and the normative commitments of past and future generations. This
remains a task for judges who may be influenced by popular debates but who must, in
the end, do their best to interpret the Constitution in light of text, traditions, and
purposes. 113
Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that Laurence Tribe, the treatise-writer, asserted
little coherence in constitutional law beyond consistently conflicting tendencies. 114 The
constitutionalism that he salutes-and the constitutionalism that this article means to
advance-keeps the process of debate over complex and conflictual values going rather
than shutting it down. This means harnessing difficult puzzles for their stimulation and
resisting the temptation to close off avenues of analysis and competing sources of norms
and decisions.11 5 All-things-considered approaches and individualized decisions are

110. Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (interpreting the Tenth Amendment to permit the national
government to enter into a treaty despite objection by a state and in contrast with prior understandings).
111. Tribe, supra n. 83, at 71.
112. Id.(discussing consideration of effects of potential Establishment Clause interpretation on American
schooling and society).
113. Thus, mass movements and intellectual debate outside of courts may be helpful, see Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: PolicentricInterpretationof the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943 (2003), but the judicial task of constitutional adjudication must
remain as a potential bulwark against popular views. See David J. Barron, A Rejoinderfrom ProfessorBarron,
http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/09/barron_02.html (Sept. 18, 2006); David J. Barron, What's Wrong with
Conservative Constitutionalism? Two Styles of Progressive Constitutional Critique and the Choice They
Present, http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/07/barron01 .html (Sept. 18, 2006).
114. In explaining his decision to stop work on his constitutional law treatise, Tribe explained:
It's always possible simply to give an accurate account of Supreme Court decision after decision
and to string the decisions together in the form of approximate black letter rules and underlying
rationales, but it was never my thought that a treatise of that sort was particularly useful in
constitutional law, or at least it wasn't the kind of thing I tried to write in 1978 and again in 1988,
when the second edition came out, or in 2000, when the first part of the third edition came out. I
was interested, rather, in presenting a coherent picture of constitutional law as a whole, even
recognizing that it's never wholly coherent, that there are always conflicting tendencies, and that
any body of doctrine that is the vector sum of nine arrows pulling in somewhat different directions
will always represent some kind of compromise.
Interview by Robb London with Laurence Tribe (posted Sept. 13, 2005) (available at http://
www.law.harvard.edu/news/tribe/).
115. For a similar set of commitments stemming from concerns about religious and normative meaning, see
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 16
(1983). For critical views whose very existence might delight a pluralist like Cover, see Thom Brooks, Let a
Thousand Nomoi Bloom? Four Problems with Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 2006 Issues Leg.
Scholarship 5 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l071&context-ils; Judith Resnik,
Living Their Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 Yale J.L. & Humanities 17
(2005).
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problematic because they are unpredictable and yet they seem to characterize lay and
expert views of wisdom. 116 Particularized case-by-case judicial attention can include
assessment of the cumulative impact of religious schooling on the character of the nation
and the predicates for inclusive democracy as well as the balance between state
prerogatives and federal demands. Even though case-by-case decision-making allows
uncertainty and preserves tensions between lines of doctrine on potential collision
courses with one another, it also permits law to evolve with practical responsiveness to
the multiple priorities relevant to religion, schooling, and democracy.

116. See Robert J. Sternberg, Wisdom, Intelligence, and Creativity Synthesized (Cambridge U. Press 2003);
Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins,and Development (Robert J. Steinberg ed., Cambridge U. Press 1990).
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